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The increase in size, automation and complexity of modern sociotechnical systems changed the dynamics of 
work environments and calls for new methodologies and metaphors towards safety of complex systems. 
Chemical, nuclear, and transportation (i.e. road, maritime, and aviation) industries are composed of various 
nested sub-systems where smooth coordination and communication are essential features to achieve 
continuous and safe operations. Even though such sub-systems exist since the industrial revolution, fewer 
studies have been conducted in these domains: to understand the work as it is done (rather than it is 
imagined), which is the only way to shed light about the variability in work performance and how these sub-
systems can combine to generate dangerous and unexpected outcomes. The theoretical framework of 
Distributed Situation Awareness provides a firm background to investigate the sub-systems that constitute the 
chemical, nuclear, and maritime industries/domains. This paper unfolds the key sub-systems (e.g., operators, 
human-computer interfaces, communication tools, and distant/different locations) that play a critical role in 
normal and abnormal situations in these industries. The complex interconnections among various artifacts are 
explained and their significance is assessed.  
1. Introduction 
In systems with multiple adaptive agents, task-relevant awareness and knowledge must be distributed among 
the involved agents . When the awareness of task-relevant information is distributed among multiple agents 
this is called Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) and has been defined as “…activated knowledge for a 
specific task, at a specific time within a system” (Salmon et al., 2006), p. 1291). In addition, DSA is seen as 
being an emergent property of the joint cognitive system. In other words, it is not reducible to any specific 
actor in the system. This can be seen in correspondence with a systems approach, which is aptly described in 
the following quote: “Complex systems cannot be understood by studying parts in isolation. The very essence 
of the system lies in the interaction between parts and the overall behavior that emerges from the interactions. 
The system must be analyzed as a whole.” (Ottino, 2003), p. 293). However, describing the psychological or 
systemic construct of DSA is not only of academic interest, but also of particular practical interest for the 
identification of how DSA is related to the capability of remaining in control of a dynamic process. Situation 
Awareness is – as we will debate – intimately related to being in control. In order to ensure safe and efficient 
operation one must focus on the interactions and coordination among the control units (Petersen, 2004) . DSA 
is thus a system construct that according to proponents resides in the whole system (Stanton et al., 2006). 
The system can be understood by considering the whole instead of parts, as each part has multilevel 
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connections and dependencies to other parts. When the control system involves humans that are able to 
perceive and understand the meaning of elements in the world around them, the system model must also 
encompass the characteristics of humans. Several industrial accidents evolved on account of lack of 
understanding of the interconnections of subsystems (let us not forget human is an important subsystem 
constituting the whole system) (De Carvalho, 2011). Indeed, the collaborative compatibility among the 
subsystems enables the whole system to work in an efficient (Nazir et al., 2015), effective (Vidal et al., 2009), 
and importantly safer way (Nazir and Manca, 2014). In sociotechnical systems the governance of the system 
relies on multiple adaptive actors – both humans and technical. Automatons are (like humans) adaptive 
agents as they can react to changes in the controlled process and by themselves bring about system state 
changes (Hollnagel and Woods, 1999). This is commonly seen in any automated system, from the simple 
homeostatic controller to a complicated multidimensional control as in Dynamic Positioning systems used 
aboard vessels in the maritime domain (Stanton et al., 2014). Likewise, the chemical industry is saturated with 
complex interdependencies, dynamic interactions among various agents , and multi-level control loops and 
nuclear power plants, which are composed of several sub-systems e.g., hardware, human operators and 
control systems (Junior et al., 2012, Carvalho et al., 2007). Thus, like humans, automated systems perceive 
the world (often through sensor inputs) and adapt to this input by effectuating some type of output or action 
that can bring about system state changes (Petersen, 2004). From a control theoretical viewpoint, enabling 
control maintenance in sociotechnical systems requires the awareness of assessing the necessary changes 
that must be made in order to achieve some goal (e.g., control requirements) and the possible ways on how 
an operator can produce these changes (e.g., control possibilities) (Petersen, 2004). Hence, an adaptive 
agent must be aware of what is needed to be done to achieve a goal, and the agent must know how the 
necessary actions can be done. In a reduced manner, we can say that DSA is awareness of the current and 
near future control requirements as well as the current and near future control possibilities. 
The article describes communalities among three domains (namely nuclear, chemical, and maritime) of 
sociotechnical systems (Nazir et al., 2014) and connects the hierarchical means-ends approach (Moray et al., 
1994) to point out the necessary parts that should be the content of DSA. For instance, the content of DSA 
should be related to the parts of the sociotechnical system’s means-end hierarchy and how sub-systems are 
able to cause changes in system states that enable goal achievement in a controlled manner. By defining the 
subsystems and their interrelationships as described by control requirements and control possibilities, we 
define the areas where the content of DSA is similar among different domains. Hence, if two or more systems 
have similar interrelationships among sub-systems or within the nested sub-systems with regard to control 
situations, then these similarities will allow the research to be transferable among research domains. The 
following sections highlight briefly the subsystems of the three industries under focus. 
2. Process systems in Chemical and Nuclear domains 
A process industry is the combination of hardware (equipment, process units like distillation columns, heat 
exchanger, furnaces, boilers, vessel, pumps, compressors, valves), software (soft sensors (Ahmed et al., 
2009), feedback and feed-forward controllers, model based techniques, real time optimization), automation, 
utilities, and human operators. All these components (or adaptive agents) complement each other, and any 
their failure may result in devastating accidents. Communication among various agents (as per the definition 
of DSA) is of vital importance for the continuous operations and production, the significance of which 
increases manifold once abnormalities or uncertainties are introduced in the system. 
In an early study on nuclear power plant operations, Carvalho and Vidal (2007) indicated that safety and 
availability of nuclear operations still rely on humans, both through human reliability and human ability to 
handle adequately unexpected events. Ergonomic field studies of nuclear power plant control room operator 
activities(Mrugalska, 2014) and more specifically on the analysis of communications within control room crews 
show how operators use verbal exchanges to produce continuous, redundant, and diverse interactions to 
successfully construct and maintain individual and mutual awareness, which is of paramount importance to 
achieve system stability and safety. Such continuous interactions enable the operators to prevent, detect, and 
reverse system errors or flaws by anticipation or regulation.  
The first effort to use the DSA in improving process safety was conducted by Nazir et al. (2014). They explain 
how the ultimate consequences of abnormal situations depend on the shared understanding, compatibility, 
and effective communication among operators (Nazir et al., 2012). They also highlight the importance of both 
shared mental model and joint cognition to facilitate communication and the subsequently necessary actions. 
The adaptability of the control systems defines the resilience of the system i.e. the higher the adaptability the 
higher the ability of the system to absorb the uncertainties and operate (or return) within the safe operating 
conditions (Rankin et al., 2014). The categorization of operators in chemical/nuclear industry is broadly split 
into two i.e. control room operators and field operators. The former are responsible to work in a control room, 
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which involves architectures, mechanisms, and algorithms for monitoring and controlling the plant. The latter 
work in the field, where the operations are generally performed physically (if and when required) and 
continuous communication with the control room is also expected. 
Figure 1 shows, in a very simplistic manner, the distributed nature of both chemical and nuclear industries, the 
agents involved, and the possible control situations. The descriptive analysis of each subsystem is out of 
scope of this paper.  
 
 
Figure 1: The control situations and their interconnections among various agents that constitute DSA in 
chemical and nuclear industries. The Red Arrows show communication, Blue Arrows show Control Action 
Input, Dashed Arrows indicate information modified by Control Systems, and Yellow Arrows show feedback to 
the (sub)system  
3. Subsystems in maritime domain 
The main activity in the maritime domain is to navigate vessels between ports. Maritime Navigation is 
composed of hardware in the form of vessels (e.g., hull, machinery), of control system hardware (e.g., input 
devices, screens, dials) and of software in the form of control systems (e.g., dynamic positioning systems; 
Sørensen, 2011) and finally of the operative environment – which is continuously changing and that requires 
constant adaptation. The maritime domain is also characterized by a number of factors that greatly increase 
complexity of operations such as the lack of standardization of interfaces and technology, complex and 
variable team compositions, changing constituents of work teams, cross-disciplinary teams, and the 
geographical distributions of workers and teams. Figure 2 shows the schematic overview of the main 
components/teams aboard a vessel and their interconnections. 
As mentioned above, the crew aboard vessels can vary greatly, but there are two major teams (navigators and 
machine engineers) that are always aboard large vessels. Navigators are responsible for safely and efficiently 
manoeuvre and navigate the ship and to show timely and correct adaptive manoeuvres when the vessel 
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encounters environmental challenges (e.g., weather) or other vessels/obstacles. For manoeuvring, the 
navigators will utilize control actions on the vessel’s bridge control systems which are transduced and 
transformed by the automatic control systems to the effector system (e.g., propellers and rudders) that will 
have their effect on the water surrounding the ship’s hull. The navigator’s job is to adjust the vessel to 
disturbances from the outside world. On the other side, the machine engineers’ main responsibility is to 
maintain and supervise the vessel’s power plants to ensure that the ship has sufficient power to enable the 
necessary work tasks. Their work domain is restricted to the power plants itself, hence they do not adapt to 
external disturbances as the Navigators are doing.  
 
Figure 2: The control situations and their interconnections among various agents that constitute DSA in 
maritime industry. The Red Arrow shows communication, Blue Arrows show Control Action Input, Dashed 
Arrows indicate that information modified by Control System and Yellow Arrows show feedback to the 
(sub)system 
4. Comparison of domains 
The differences among nuclear, chemical, and maritime domains are evident in terms of the final product i.e. 
transportation in case maritime, desired product (e.g., polymer, fertilizer, commodities, fuel, pharmaceuticals) 
in case of chemical industry, and energy in case of nuclear power plants. However, in terms of complexity, 
socio-technical and control/functionality, similarities are present. Within the concept of control theory, as 
explained earlier, the functional similarities among various agents/sub-systems in these domains are 
summarized in Table 1. 
The three columns of Table 1 show the common features among the various agents, independent of the terms 
and acronyms used. The main challenges, as categorised in the first column under the heading of 
functionality, are faced in each industry and a clear relevance exists. Even though, the operations and 
technical details have differences among these industries, the cognitive resources required by the relevant 
operator to successfully handle and execut the tasks are broadly similar.  
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 Table 1: Similarities among Nuclear, Chemical, and Maritime domains/industries in the light of DSA and 
control situations 
Functionality Nuclear Industry Chemical Industry Maritime Industry 
Automated control 
system 
New plants: Real time 
optimization, model predictive 
control, dynamic predictive 
controllers, soft sensors, 
emergency shutdown system. 
Old plants: no digital 
controllers, hardwired 
automation, safety related 
functions automated 
Real time optimization, 
model predictive control, 
dynamic predictive 
controllers, soft sensors, 
emergency shutdown 
system, etc. 
DP, Machine controllers, 
Automatic identification 
systems, sensors in power 
plants, emergency 
shutdown system etc. 
Presence of sub-
systems 
Hardware (unit operations), 
control systems, human 
operators 
Hardware (unit operations), 
control systems, human 
operators 
Bridge, control systems, 
human-machine 
interfaces, Human 
operators, external 
environment  
Uncertainties in 
systems 
Abnormalities in operating 
conditions, leakages, human 
error (slips, lapses, rule 
violations), lack of appropriate 
procedure, etc. 
Abnormalities in operating 
conditions, leakages, 
human error (slips, lapses, 
rule violations), lack of 
appropriate procedure, lack 
of appropriate procedure, 
etc. 
Unexpected events 
(behaviour of other 
vessels and weather), 
blackout, engine 
malfunction, malfunction 
on effector/control 
systems, knowledge of 
water depths (for 
coastal/shallow waters) 
Human –Human 
Interaction 
Continuous interaction among 
control room operators, 
maintenance operators, field 
operator, non-technical staff 
Continuous interaction 
among control room 
operators, maintenance 
operators, field operator, 
non-technical staff 
Continuous verbal 
communication within 
bridge and within machine 
room. Radio 
communication between 
bridge and machine room.
 
 
 
Human-Machine 
Interface 
New plants: Distributed 
control screens, supervisory 
control and data acquisition, 
Process and Instrumentation 
displays 
Old plants: Analogue control 
rooms, hardwired synoptic 
panels, knobs and dials 
Distributed control screens, 
supervisory control and 
data acquisition, Process 
and Instrumentation 
displays 
On bridge: Radar, ECDIS, 
Radio communication, 
User interfaces for control 
of effector systems.  
Control loops 
Spread throughout the plant, 
interconnections at multilevel 
with dependencies and inter-
dependencies among various 
agents (See Figure 1). 
Spread throughout the 
plant, interconnections at 
multilevel with 
dependencies and inter-
dependencies among 
various agents. (See Figure 
1). 
See Figure 2 
Distributed nature 
Subsystems and adaptive 
agents are geographically 
distant, e.g., control room 
operators, production 
facilities, and field operators 
Subsystems and adaptive 
agents are geographically 
distant as well, e.g., control 
room operators, production 
facilities and field operators
Subsystems and adaptive 
agents are geographically 
distributed inside one 
vessel (e.g., bridge and 
machine room) and large 
operations often include 
multiple vessels. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper showed that in spite of differences in complex systems, the application of human factors constructs 
(DSA, in this case) allows researchers across various disciplines to work together to improve the safety 
among those sectors. Thus, the tools and methods developed for one domain can be deployed for another. In 
addition, we highlighted the necessity and importance of investigating the sub-systems in nuclear, chemical, 
and maritime domains. This work can be considered as a starting point to explore the similarities in terms of 
adaptive agents and sub-systems involved in complex socio technical systems. 
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